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This study explores the
social and ecological
impacts of circulatory land
tenure in the villages of
Allahdand and Dheri,
situated near one another
in the lower Swat valley
(upper part of Malakand
Agency). Apart from
communal hill slopes,
agricultural land is divided into 3 categories: damani (rainfed),
jewardara (irrigated but with no rice), and shoulgarey
(irrigated, mainly used for rice). The people permanently own
the rainfed land, while the irrigated land is under a tenure
system known as garzinda wesh (circulatory tenure), with 10
years’ tenure rotation allotted through khasanray (drawing lot).
This type of land tenure system also exists partially in other
villages of Upper Malakand such as Jolagaram, Khar, and
Totakan. This system was introduced in the 16th century with
the idea of sharing all types of land—including irrigated land,
fertile land, slope land, etc—in equal shares and with the aim
of enabling the landowner tribe to respond collectively if some
other tribe or majority tenants tried to seize any portion of
land. Due to social conflicts, this system can have negative
impacts today, especially in the form of soil erosion leading to
land degradation. We highlight the positive and negative
environmental impacts of the system. To this purpose, a
detailed survey was conducted using focus group interviews,
participatory rural appraisals, mapping, and transit walks with
timelines. The results show how social response to the
suitability of the system for livelihoods and social integrity can
vary. The impact on fuelwood consumption is negative,
leading to deforestation and lack of soil conservation.
Abolishment of garzinda wesh in the village is recommended.
Keywords: Circulatory land tenure; soil conservation;
Malakand district; Swat districts; North West Frontier Province
(NWFP); Pakistan.
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Introduction and context
Land tenure and its socioeconomic and ecological
implications have long been debated (Payne 2004). Since
Hardin’s (1968) famous and much discussed ‘‘tragedy of
the commons’’ theory, the theme has been explored in
many ways, among which Elinor Ostrom’s 8 design
principles add a new dimension to the debate (Sarker and
Itoh 2001). In Pakistan, in the local context of a tribal
social setup where a centralized cohesive mechanism (ie
the state) was absent, the circulatory land tenure system
(garzinda wesh) worked to maintain the integrity of the
society and keep ownership of the entire landscape within
the hands of single ethnic groups, even if these groups
were a minority in the local population. Through garzinda
wesh, collective ownership of tribes enabled an integrated
response to external (invading tribes) and internal (revolt
by the majority of subjugated tribes or tenants) threats.
Collective circulatory tenure of cropland was obligatory
in the tribal environment; it was necessary for the
commanding tribe to maintain possession of land.
However, after permanent settlement began and revenue
recording was established, such collective and circulatory
tenure arrangements became prohibitive to effective use
of land resources. This paper investigates the landowner
communities’ perception of the system and analyzes its
economic and ecological repercussions.
The history of garzinda wesh shows that initially large
landscapes were exchanged between samma (southern
plain area of Mardan and Sawabi districts) and swat
(northern mountainous area of Malakand and Adinzai
area of Lower Dir and Swat districts). This was followed by
a garzinda wesh system at the tappa level (medium
landscape), village level, and finally within the village. The
samma- and swat-level wesh were terminated very soon
after their initiation due to disputes among the 2
Yousafzai subtribes occupying the territories (probably
before 1600), while the tappa-level wesh ended arbitrarily
with the occupation of Malakand by the British and of
Adinzai (southeastern part of Dir) by the Nawab of Dir in
1880–1900. After the establishment of Swat state in 1917,
the first wali (king) of Swat worked to strategically abolish
the wesh system (Sultan-i-Rome 2005) in order to weaken
the integrity of Yousafzai tribes and to establish the writ
of his state. In Malakand Agency (now the District of
Malakand), however, village-level wesh still continues in
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some villages, including the 2 adjoining villages of
Allahdand and Dheri. In this district are two main tappas:
Baizai (southeastern part of Malakand) and Ranizai
(northwestern part of Malakand). In Baizai tappa, wesh has
already been abolished, while in Ranizai tappa, it still
exists in half of the villages. These villages include
Jolagram, Khar, Totakan, and Allahdand and Dheri (now
commonly known as Allahdand Dheri).
The process adopted for allotment of land in garzinda
wesh is that land parcels are allotted through khasanray
(drawing lot). The wesh include the ghar (hillside) and samma
(plain area) land, including damani (rainfed), jewardara
(semi-irrigated, for growing maize), and shoulgara (irrigated,
for growing rice) land in the territory of a village (dawtar)
(Inam-ur-Rahim and Viaro 2002). In the local context, with
the gradual extension initially of the British and then the
Pakistan state to the Malakand Agency, the elders
(masharaan) of the landowner tribes strategically abolished
garzinda wesh, either completely or partially. In Alladand
Dheri village, partial wesh was adopted; the damani area was
permanently divided in the first phase (mid-20th century).
However, during the early 1970s, because of the forceful
occupation of the land by the tenants and the inability of
the individual landowner families to maintain their
ownership, the permanent distribution (toriraan wesh) of the
jewardara and shoulgara was avoided or delayed.
Some local researchers (Inam-ur-Rahim 2000, 2002;
Lubna 2001; Inam-ur-Rahim and Viaro 2002) have
highlighted the social aspects of the tenure system, while
others have studied the historical aspects of its
abolishment over time (eg Sultan-i-Rome 2005) or
investigated the possibilities of farming, forestry, and
agroforestry on such lands and associated problems
(Zubair and Garforth 2006). The economic and ecological
aspects of circulatory land tenure remained to be
investigated. Hence, this paper focuses on two aspects of
garzinda wesh based on social survey techniques: the
mechanisms of garzinda wesh and the economical/
ecological costs and benefits. In this study an attempt has
been made to answer questions such as, what are the
problems associated with the present system, and how can
corresponding tenure conflicts and resource degradation
such as soil erosion and deforestation be avoided?
The study area
Allahdand Dheri is a small village located at latitude/
longitude 343422.49 N, 715901.47 E to 343842.23 N,
720214.96 E in the lower southern part of Swat valley, in
the administrative subdivision of Swat Ranizai in
Malakand administrative district (Figure 1). It is
surrounded by mountains to the east, west, and south;
cultivated land and the river Swat lie to the north. The
households that have a share of landholdings in the village
belong to the Ali-Khail subsection of the Yousafzai tribe.
The total area, including cultivated land and suburbs,
is about 21.38 km2. The 13 village wards (mohallahs)
include the residents of landowner families (khail), and 7
main hamlets (banda) in the foothills with rainfed land are
occupied mainly by the tenants. According to the 1998
census the total population of the area was 32,506.
The hillside is communal land and is generally used
for grazing and fuelwood collection, mainly by tenants.
The gentle slopes close to the hillside are used for
rainfed agriculture. Tenants occupy some of the
permanently divided damani land, while a large
proportion is still possessed by traditional landowners.
The irrigated land is divided into two main types,
jewardara and shoulgarey. The continual availability of
water and its marshy nature make shoulgarey suitable for
cultivating rice along with other crops, whereas the
intermittent irrigation possibilities in jewardara make
that area suitable for maize and vegetable fields and
orchards. Among shoulgarey are the lands called serai that
are permanently allocated to the leaders of the subtribes,
holy families (sayydan), and Chief of Masque (Paish-Imam)
for their religious services; sairai are therefore not part
of the circulation.
Methodology
To prepare the land use map, satellite images available
from Google Earth were accessed between 15 May 2006
and 13 February 2007. A global positioning system (GPS)
was used during 7 transit walks to explore the proportion
of different land types (4 walks east–west and 3 walks
north–south). The GPS was calibrated at 3 points:
Amandara Square (343713.75 N, 715917.66 E), Chakdara
Bridge Square (343714.75N, 715917.66E), and Alladand
Dheri Choke Square (343710.23N, 720125.02E). The
Google Earth image Digital Globe @ 2007 by the Quick-
Bird satellite was imported in JPG format in IDRISI for
digitization and quantification. The display resolution
was 1024 3 768 pixels and ground resolution was 2.4 m.
The map produced was exported again into JPG format.
The map of Malakand district was composed in ArcView.
Information for the map of Malakand district was
retrieved from the Forest Management Center in
Peshawar.
To explore the willingness of the landowner families to
continue circulatory tenure through the drawing of lots,
interviews were carried out in the village. As landownership
is limited by definition to males, only men were
interviewed. The interviewed people included both elderly
and younger males who had a share of landholdings.
Altogether, 300 respondents (landowners), or 20% of the
total number of households that owned land in the village,
were interviewed. To identify trends in fuelwood collected
from the surrounding mountains, a participatory rural
appraisal was conducted using the timeline method.
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Results
Under the current situation, landownership in the study
area is divided into private and communal land. The
mountains are communal land and belong to the whole
landowner tribe, with absent landlords who have shares of
different subsections. However, these shares are open to
everyone for grazing and fuelwood collection, particularly
to the tenants occupying the adjoining foothills. Rainfed
cultivated land is under permanent private ownership,
while irrigated land is under a communal type of
ownership with temporary allotment to individual
households for periods of 10 years.
Cultivated land is either rainfed or irrigated through a
canal diverted from the river Swat. The rainfed area
covers 705.12 hectares (32.97%), and the irrigated area
covers 355.77 hectares (16.64%). With 78.68 hectares
(3.68%), horticulture is part of the irrigated land under
permanent ownership, while the residential area covers
265.75 hectares (12.43%) and mountains slopes cover
732.77 hectares (34.27%), totaling 2059.41 hectares of
landed estate or dawtar (Figure 2).
As shown in Table 1, among the interviewed
landowners, 11.67% possess an equal amount of land with
maize and rice. They are happy with both maintenance and
abolishment of circulatory tenure through drawing of lots.
An additional 61.66% produce sufficient wheat or rice: they
obtain all of their household’s staple subsistence
requirements from their own landholdings and do not need
to purchase staple foods elsewhere. This group does not
want to abolish circulatory tenure. Another 26.67% have
small landholdings with either type of land; of this group,
44.75% (11.66% of the total) have limited good-quality land
and are verymuch interested in the khasanray, or lot-drawing
system, because they hope to get a larger piece of land in the
coming khasanray. The remaining 55.25% in this group seem
satisfied with their present holdings. In this way only 11.66%
of the whole village is in favor of khasanray and another
11.66% are happy with either maintaining or abolishing the
system, while the remaining 76.67% are not interested in
keeping it (Table 1).
Due to shortage of fuelwood and free access to the
communal hillside area, people were collecting fuelwood
from the surrounding shrub-covered mountains. These
mountains sufficed to support the village inhabitants’ need
for fuelwood until the early 1980s. Then, within a period of
5 years, forest and shrub cover disappeared completely.
The reason for this was partly social—including the
tragedy of the commons—and partly political as, during
the late 1970s, the hillside tenants who occupied the area
revolted against the landowners and the traditional hillside
control and management system vanished. As a result,
everyone started cutting trees and shrubs, after which they
also dug out the roots for a period of 4–5 years. Now the
mountains are completely barren (Figure 3).
Figure 4 shows a decrease of up to 40% in the
consumption of fuelwood in the last 47 years. During the
period 1960–1965 all the households were using fuelwood
for cooking and heating, as no alternative was available in
the village. From 1965 onward the use of kerosene stoves
FIGURE 1 Map of Malakand district and study area. (Map by M. Nafees; source: Forest
Management Center, Peshawar, Pakistan)
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was initiated. These stoves had a pungent smell but
produced no smoke and helped reduce fuelwood
consumption. In 1975, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinders reached the village and gradually started
replacing the kerosene stoves, with well-off families
handing on the stoves to the middle-income group. From
2005 to 2006, a natural gas supply pipe reached some
areas in the Malakand Agency and Allahdand Dheri
village, and it is likely to be extended to the entire village
in the future. This will further increase the shift to
nonwood fuel resources and may reduce pressure on
hillside fuel resources around the main villages. On the
FIGURE 2 Land use map of the village of Allahdand Dheri. (Map by M. Nafees; created using
Google Earth and IDRISI)
TABLE 1 Landownership and people’s attitudes toward circulatory tenure with khasanray in the village of Alladand Dheri. (Source: interviews)
Respondents’ answers regarding
their landholdings
Total
number
of
answers
%
answers
Wish to abolish
khasanray
Wish to
continue
khasanray
Happy with
both solutions
Possess equal proportion of
land with maize and rice
35 11.67 Nil (0%) Nil (0%) 35 (11.66%)
Possess land with rice, with
surplus rice production
85 28.33 85 (28.33%) Nil (0%) Nil (0%)
Possess land with maize or
wheat, with surplus production
100 33.33 100 (33.33%) Nil (0%) Nil (0%)
Possess small plot of either
type of land
80 26.67 45 (15.00%) 35 (11.66%) Nil (0%)
Total 300 100 230 (76.67%) 35 (11.66%) 35 (11.66%)
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other hand, in spite of all these innovations the tenant
residents of scattered hamlets and the poor in the village
are still largely dependent on fuelwood for cooking and
heating, as they have no access to the alternative fuel
resources. Despite its availability, electricity is not used
for cooking and heating because of its high cost.
Discussion
Contemporary trends
Traditional societies developed rich, flexible legal systems
that were well adapted to local circumstances. Indigenous
law offered the population residing in a particular
environment a range of suitable solutions that met their
needs (Verhelst 1992). The garzinda wesh system provided a
sustainable base for survival to the local people for almost
5 centuries in a conflictual tribal environment. On the
other hand, in marginal areas communities’ highest
priorities were issues that carried the most immediate
implications for their survival and wellbeing (Fussel
1995). Hence, there is a need for better quantitative
information and assessment of the social and economic
causes and consequences of land degradation (Sombroek
1996).
Village-based partial fixation of the garzinda wesh
system started in 1919 in the upper and middle part of the
Swat valley and was completed by 1929 (Sultan-i-Rome
2005), due to the interest of the wali of Swat. The
Malakand Agency appeared as a separate administrative
unit during 1895–1896 (Fatima and Batoor 2008); hence,
such fixation could not be extended to the lower Swat
valley, which was a separate administrative unit.
Therefore, land distribution through drawing of lots was
maintained in some villages of the lower part of the Swat
valley (Swat Ranizai) and is still being practiced in some
FIGURE 3 Example of severe gully erosion, caused partially by khasanray or lot-drawing circulatory tenure. Deforested mountains are visible in the background.
(Photo by M. Nafees)
FIGURE 4 Trend in use of fuelwood and alternate sources of energy from 1960
to 2007.
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areas today, such as Allahdand Dheri, Khar, and Totakan.
The system has both positive and negative implications,
not only for soils but also for other natural resources such
as forests and wildlife; moreover, it has a direct impact on
the socioeconomic condition of the people, particularly
the landowner group.
Indeed, the freezing of the garzinda wesh system on the
one hand may provide new opportunities for medium-
and long-term investment in agriculture and housing
development (Taddese 2001), but on the other hand it
may initiate conflicts over landownership elsewhere,
either between villages or within villages (Kusters et al
2007), particularly among Pukhtun cousins (this main
ethnic group occupied the area in the early 16th century).
Moreover, the refusal of tenants in some southern parts of
the valley to pay rent to the individual landowners, in an
attempt to abolish circulatory land tenure, led to several
armed encounters with bloodshed between the
landowners and tenants, particularly during the late
1970s. Tenants in Malakand had organized themselves
politically under the slogan of a peasant movement called
Kissan Tehrik; freezing of garzinda wesh did not facilitate
the position of landowners, who lost the unified stand
they had had during circulatory land tenure.
In case of permanent distribution of land and rapid
demographic growth, the land share available to
individual households decreases to the extent that its
cultivation is no longer economically viable. The lower
farm income and seasonality in production for small
landholders compel their youth to migrate to lowland
cities and abroad to produce remittances. This causes
remittance-dependent population explosion, further
fragmentation of land, extension of cropland to marginal
land, and labor force shortages during peak periods
(Inam-ur-Rahim 2000). This in turn leads indigenous
agriculture to gradually become a secondary to tertiary
activity. Land is mainly viewed as a salable asset or a zone
for future residential construction. Most of the accessible
small parcels of fertile land available in the valley under
permanent distribution are therefore increasingly
encroached upon by concrete buildings, including
residences and shops (Inam-ur-Rahim 2002). Being under
circulatory wesh, the shoulgarey of Allahdand Dheri are the
only large cultivated landscape left in the entire valley and
may meet the same fate in the absence of appropriate
land use planning after abolishment of the wesh system.
In the village of Allahdand Dheri, because of a conflict
over reallotment of land in 1982, this system could not
continue, and the people who had some land at that time
still possess the same plots as allotted in 1978. Because they
fear that these plots may be redistributed and despite the
fact that they have possessed these land units for the past 30
years, they do not use it for any kind of construction,
horticulture, or other perennial plantation. This leads to
economic disadvantages for the individual landholding
family. On the other hand, circulatory tenuremay also offer
an opportunity to develop a fully mechanical large-scale
communal agricultural enterprise with profits for the
different landowners according to their shares of land. This
would be in line with collectivization trends in developed
economies, if appropriately strategized as suggested by
Ashutosh and Tadao (2001) for Japanese common-pool
irrigation resources. The small and dispersed parcels of
land resulting from permanent distribution may serve as
salable assets or be covered by concrete buildings, but that
use may lead to more effective investment in physical
improvement, particularly of large pieces of land, leading
to more economic benefit for the landholding households.
Conflicts and conflict management
As resource managers, landowners divided the landscape
into sites comprising one to several soil series with
different production capacities (Archer and Smeins 1991);
hence, land division under garzinda wesh included
different productivity zones. Such land zones were also
differentiated according to slope and accessibility criteria
(Pratt et al 1997). During distribution and reallotment,
soil fertility is the main factor considered. A person with
less fertile land, called kayeena, will receive extra land
attached with what is called ewaz (benefit), which is 30% of
the total leading to the possession of a large piece of land,
whereas the person with fertile land, called gwariza,
receives a small land share.
Such zoning at one time promoted equity in
distribution of the benefits within a longer time frame,
but it has now become a cause of conflict. Currently some
people who have large plots of land and are presently
occupying gwariza land are not interested in khasanray, nor
are those who now have a large plot in the form of kayeena
and must expect a small piece of gwariza after reallotment
interested in khasanray. People with a small plot of gwariza
expecting a large piece of land in reallotment, or people
with a maximum plot where they can grow maize and
minimum land for rice, are interested in khasanray.
Similarly, people presently allotted land along the
roadside are not interested in the redrawing of lots, while
those at a distance from the road also favor redistribution
of land. All the people interviewed are therefore looking
to their personal interest and not to the collective
advantage or disadvantage of circulatory tenure.
In 1982 the Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA) passed a 66 kV electric line through the land
under circulatory distribution and paid Pakistan Rs
30,000 (approximately US$ 500) per pole to each
landowner. The WAPDA people were unaware of the
situation and paid the money to the shareholders who
held the land when the electric poles were erected. Later,
during reallotment in 1988, people who were supposed to
receive the land with electric poles in reallotment asked
for a share in the paid money of Rs 30,000, but the
previous possessors were not willing to pay. This led to
postponement of khasanray. When the people met again in
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1998, the stakeholders who had been paid showed their
willingness to repay the Rs 30,000 they had received for
further distribution. In response, the people who were
expecting their share asked for provision of the money
according to the inflation rate of the previous 10 years.
This request led to division among landowners on the
issue of redistribution. In Dheri, khasanray took place, and
in Allahdand, those involved are still in conflict.
This conflict can negatively affect natural resources, as
revealed from a study conducted in Indonesia, where a
conflict arose in 1998 on land tenure between local
communities and tree plantation companies, and also
between local communities and the forestry department.
The hazard appeared in the form of unwanted fires and
forest degradation-related smoke and gas emissions,
leading to environmental and economic losses (Suyanto
2006). Another study regarding common property was
conducted in Ethiopia; it concluded that this regime was
good for conservation of natural resources and people’s
livelihoods (Zelealem and Williams 2005) and led to a
conflict-free situation. However, in Zimbabwe conflict
emerged on communal property during the post-
independence period as of 1980. The indigenous system
was continued for about 20 years, which put pressure on
land and other natural resources, and was ultimately
changed as a result of a peasant movement in 2000. The
reallocation of the communal land led to a lifting of the
burden on natural resources and an improvement of the
socioeconomic condition (Moyo 2005). Individual
property ownership has also been supported by Liu et al
(2004), who studied the impact of management change
that took place in 1970, wherein an attempt was made to
put responsibility on households and shift from the
collective farming system to individual family farms. An
increase in the yield was observed with a decrease in soil
fertility, for which proper use of fertilizers was suggested.
People’s attitude toward khasanray
Due to the temporary nature of the availability of
irrigated land (10 years), no construction of any kind of
building can take place on it. In this way, construction on
rainfed land continues, and people are deprived of one
kind of asset (rainfed land); however, the ban has also
prevented conversion of the most fertile land to concrete
surfaces, though it is an impediment to the
socioeconomic development of the stakeholder
communities. As observed in Maya, Belize, the land tenure
system (60% of the population have no ownership) in
combination with limited availability of agricultural land,
the low level of investment in agricultural production,
and limited marketing opportunities are the main reasons
for forest degradation. The study was in support of
permanent ownership (Levasseur and Olivier 2000).
This system also discourages long-term ‘‘green’’
activities such as agroforestry or horticulture (Kakembo
2001). On the one hand it affects the socioeconomic
condition of the people (Dale 1997), and on the other
hand it has an impact on the availability of fuelwood. The
maize-growing (jewardara) land is very much suitable for
horticulture, with supplementary fuel obtained during
pruning, but the lot-drawing system discourages such
interventions. If the people in the area start using this
land for horticulture, maize production will decrease 10–
20%, but in return, the people will harvest fruit, which is
economically more beneficial than maize. The same trend
has been observed in the villages of Sandwip Upazila,
Chittagong district (Momen et al 2006).
Another option that may help increase economic
power in the area is developmental activities along the
roadsides. Almost 15% of the land is permanently
allocated, called serai, and mostly situated along the road.
It is used for tourist activities such as cafe´s, generating
more income than mere use for rice cultivation, while
similar land under khasanray cannot be used. If the
garzinda wesh is abolished, the remaining land situated on
along the road will also be available to the people to
improve their economic condition. This type of
relationship is reflected in a study conducted in Benin, in
western Africa, where land tenure was related to long-
term commercial use of land. It was argued that as
tenants, the landless are disadvantaged compared with
landowners in terms of their ability to adopt agroforestry
systems. This is due to a lack of land resources, tenure
insecurity, and restrictions in planting perennial crops.
State interventions and conflicts between farmers and
pastoralists further limit land tenure security of the rural
population and thus reduce the willingness of peasants to
invest on a long-term basis and to protect natural
resources (Neef and Heidhues 1994).
A further problem detected by the study was the
following: people tend not to take into consideration the
problem of erosion due to floods (Figure 3). Rather, they
cut the steel wire used in the embankment as a net and
use it for fishing or other personal needs, hence exposing
the protected land to flooding. Besides, deforested
mountains are not only contributing to erosion but also
leading to habitat loss. In this way, agricultural land (both
rainfed and irrigated) is under continuous threat of
erosion. Due to communal tenure conflicts, the
mountains have been severely degraded. Rehabilitation of
degraded lands is, however, a complex and long-term
issue and requires integration of various technical, social,
and political concerns (Atiq-ur-Rehman 1997). Various
organizations have engaged in rehabilitating these
mountains (Lubna 2001). But insecure tenure along with
heavy pressure in terms of fuelwood collection is limiting
effectiveness. To bring sustainability to reforestation and
afforestation activities, it is important to encourage
agroforestry (Zubair and Garforth 2006) and horticulture
on both rainfed and irrigated land. Kerosene oil, LPG
cylinders, and recently natural gas were introduced in the
area with the idea of decreasing the pressure on fuelwood.
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These alternative sources of energy have proven
beneficial for the environment.
The suspended sediment load in the river Swat,
according to the WAPDA (Lahore record), was 2207.53 t/
day in 2001. This figure increased to 10,754.18 t/day in
2002 and 41,458.49 t/day in 2003. The average daily
discharge was 137.81 m3/s, 152.77 m3/s, and 186.72 m3/s
for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003, respectively. This
ever-increasing suspended sediment load is a clear
indicator of soil erosion attributed to deforestation,
partly contributed by garzinda wesh.
Conclusion
Based on historical documents, a literature review, and a
local study, the system of revolving ownership in the
current sociopolitical environment was found to be
detrimental to conservation of natural resources,
especially forests and soil; moreover, no conservation
measure seemed to be productive under such an
uncertain land tenure situation. In the study area, a
minority of the landowners was found to be interested in
continuing the garzinda wesh system, while the majority
was willing to abolish it. We therefore propose to abolish
garzinda wesh on a permanent basis, not only in the village
of Allahdand Dheri but also in the surrounding villages
such as Jolagaram, Khar, and Totakan, after appropriate
participatory land use planning has taken place. Another
option may be to retain communal ownership but avoid
rotation. In this case, the land could be rented out (for 20
years or more) for a corporate farming system, and rent
money could be distributed according to shares.
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